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PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.
VARIOUS PROBII,S SOLVED BY COMMISSION APPOINTED BY COUNCIL
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO SUBMIT PLAN FOp TIBUmNA!.
TO DETERmINE JUSTICIABLE QUESTIONS.Y

By ELmu ROOT.
Gentlemen of the Association: It is a pleasure to take part in
this series of discussions because I think it is a very valuable and
praiseworthy project on the part of the Association, and I am glad
to be able to contribute what I can by talking for a few minutes about
the subject scheduled for this evening. It is a very proper subject to
discuss here, because this Association has had something to do with
it. When the constitution for the League of Nations was proposed
and published by the conferees at Paris with a request for suggestions, the special committee of this Association upon international
law held a meeting for the purpose of considering what they ought
to do in that field. The result of that meeting was that there -vas a
unanimous resolution passed, without reference to party, race, creed
or previous condition of servitude, by the committee, recommending
and urging that there be included in the agreement or League of Nations, the following:
The High -Contracting Powers agree to refer to the existing Permanent
Court of Arbitration at the Hague, or to the Court of Arbitral Justice proposed at the Second Hague Conference, then established, or to some other
arbitral tribunals all disputes between them, including those affecting
honor and vital interests, which are of a justiciable character, and which
the powers concerned, have failed to settle by diplomatic methods. The
powers so referring to arbitration agree tc accept and give effect to the
avard of the Tribunal.
Disputes of a justiciable character are defined as disputes as to the
lnterpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the
existence of hny fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of
any international obligation, or as to the nature and extent of the reparation to be made for any such breach. Any question which may arise as
to whether a dispute is of a justiciable character, is to be referred for decision to the Court of Arbitral Justice when constituted, or1 until it is
constituted, to the existing Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.
*Address delivered by Hon. Elihu Root at the House of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, Thursday evening, Oct. 21, 120. Reprinted by
permission from Vol. VI., No. 7, of the Journal of the American Bar Association.
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That resolution was communicated to the Secretary of State of
the United States, and was cabled by him to Paris. After the communication to the gentlemen at Paris, an amendment was made to
the League agreement. I will say nothing because I know nothing
on the question whether this was propter woc or simply post hoc.
The substance of the amendment was to include in the convenant for
the League the definition as to justiciable questions given in the resolution of the committee of this Association upon international law.
That resolution, as I understand, was subsequently approved by the
Association in plenary session. The article of the League Covenant
originally reads as follows:
The members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall
arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to
arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they
will submit the 'whole subject matter to arbitration.

That is the way it stood before, and being simply an agreement
to arbitrate questions recognized as being suitable for arbitration,
didn't amount to very much. But the amendment inserts the following words:
Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, or as to any question of
international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if establshed,
would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be 'made for any such breach are
declared"to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to
arbitration.

Then it goes on:
For the consideration of any such dispute the Court of Aiibitration to
which the case is referred shall -be the Court agreed upon by the parties
to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.
The members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good
faith any award that may be rendered, and that they 'vill not resort to war
against a member of the League which complies therewith. In the event
of any failure to carry out such award, the Council shall propose what
steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

You will see that that carries into the article in a general way
the definition of justiciable questions included in your resolution.
That is a long step forward because what are known as the Taft
Treaties of Arbitration, treaties negotiated while Mr. Taft was President, between the United States and France and between the United
States and Great Britain, failed because they provided for referring
to arbitration all justiciable questions and the term "justiciable"
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was deemed so general and vague, so without any precedent upon
which to draw the line as to whaf was justiciable and what was not,
that it was considered that an agreement to refer to arbitration all
justiciable questions would involve or might involve all sorts of questions, whether of policy or of right. This definition obviates the chief
objection which led to the failure of the Taft Arbitration Treaties.
In the League Covenant it is also stated in article 14 thatThe Council shall formulate and submit to the members of the League
for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any
dispute of an interhational character which the parties thereto submit to
it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or
question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

Some time in the early spring I received an invitation from the
Council of the League of Nations, identical with an invitation which
was sent to some dozen gentlemen residing in different nations, inviting us to become members of a committee, or as they call it on
the other side, a commission, to devise and recommend a plan for
the Permanent Court of International Justice which the League
Covenant required the Council to formulate and to submit to the
members of the League for adoption. The invitation was to prepare
and recommend to the Council of the League a plan by which they
might comply with this provision of Article 14, which required them
to formulate and submit a plan for a Permanent Court of International Justice.
For many years, people concerned with international affairs
have realized that one difficulty about arbitration is that arbitrators
too often are apt to treat the cases brought before them as a matter
for settlement, for adjustment. They have come to consider, apparently, that their function is to do with the case what seems to them
to be the wisest and most expedient thing for all parties and all interests concerned. They tend to act under a sense of judicial obligation. The great difficulty about arbitration has really been not that
nations were unwilling to submit questions of law, questions of right,
the kind of questions that our courts pass upon as between individuals in municipal law, to impartial judgment, but that they had not
much confidence in getting impartial judgment because they found
that the arbitrators, when they got together, went into negotiation
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as diplomats, and no one could tell what would come out of it. The
party having no matter how strong a case, no cmatter how absolutely
right upon the question of legal right, might find itself defeated
because it seemed to the arbitrators on the whole that it perhaps
would be better that it should not have its legal rights, but that
the case should be settled as conveniently as possible.
Now, this proposed Permanent Court of International Justice
was designed to differ from the ordinary arbitral tribunal in that
respect. It was designed to be a court in which judges would sit
and decide according to law,'and let the consequences take care of
themselves. And that was the problem presented to this committee
which met at the Hague in the second week of June last.
The committee was composed of members from ten different
countries. Lord Phillimore from England. M. de Laparadella from
France. Baron Descamps from Belgium. Judge Loder from Holland. Mr. Hagerup from Norway. ir. Altamira from Spain. Mr.
Adatci from Japan. Mr. Ricci Busatti from Italy. Mr. Raoul
Fernandez from Brazil. And myself. Nobody represented any
government. We were called there as experts purely and on just
as purely expert work as if a lot of engineers had been called together to propose a plan for a bridge.
At the outset, one might suppose that it was quite a simple
thing to get up a plan for a court, but there were some very serious
difficulties involved.
A plan had been prepared at the urgent instance of the American delegates to the Second Hague Conference in 1907-a plan for
a permanent court of international justice. The name that was given
to it then was the Court of Arbitral Justice, and that was the name
that found its way into our Bar Association resolution-referring to
the "Court of Arbitral Justice" proposed at the Second Hague Conference. A general scheme of a court was devised in 1907 and reported to the Second Hague Conference-and was adopted. But,
it didn't take the form of an operative convention or treaty because
it was found impossible to agree upon the constitution of the court.
That is, it was found impossible to agree upon the way in which the
judges should be selected. There was a certain jealousy or suspicion
or prejudice or perhaps just apprehension on the part of the small
countries towards the big countries which made the small countries
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unwilling to allow the big countries to have a voice in the creation
of the court, in the naming of the judges, proportionate to their size,
proportionate to the influence they thought they ought to have. On
the other hand, the big countries were not willing to allow the great
numerical preponderance of small countries to override them and
to make up the court by overwhelming them with their votes. Great
Britain and France and Germany and Russia would not consent
that Luxenbourg and Switzerland and Hayti and San Domingo should
outvote them. There was no question about that in their minds.
So that the great countries would not consent to a vote in which
each country was to have a voice-an equal voice-in the selection
of the judges, and the small countries would not consent to a vote
in which the big countries had any greater voice than each of them
had. There the thing stopped, and the court failed in 1907 upon
that.
It was a serious difficulty, and many efforts had been made in
the meantime between 1907 and the coming on of the war to try to
get over that-but without success.
Now, in making up the plan of the court, this committee, sitting
at the Hague, adopted a plan for dealing with this subject, which
was taken very largely from the experience of the government of
the United States. It was pointed out that in 1787, when the Constitution of the United States was framed, just such a question presented itself to the convention. There were the big states, and they
weren't willing to be overdone by the numerical superiority of the
small states; and there were the small states, not willing to yield their
equal rights and give the big states any greater voice in the government of the country than they had. And that was settled by making
the two legislative bodies and giving all the states an equal voicegreat and small-in the Senate, and giving the population its voice
according to numbers in the House of Representatives, so that Nevada
has just as much voice in the Senate as New York, while New York
has forty-three times the voice in the House that Nevada has. Now,
there -vas a practical adjustment of just the same kind of a difficulty,
and after months of discussion, the committee came to a realization of the fact that, after all, this was a mere adjustment of means
to an end. It wasn't a question of sovereignty. Many of them came
to the meeting firmly resolved never, never to surrender the sovereignty
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of their small countries-not to yield one jot or title. But they finally
came to the conclusion that after all this was a court in which the
sovereignty of everybody was liable to be limited by judicial decision,
and that no one had a right to have that done, but it must be done
solely by consent. So it wasn't a question of the exercise of sovereignty; but, it was a question of consent-to be given by sovereignty,
and the question of sovereignty was satisfied if everybody had the
same right to consent or refuse to consent.
Following that line it was perceived that under the organization
of the League of Nations-an organization which would be inevitable under any sort of international organization quite independent
of specific and particular provisions in the Covenant of the League
of Nations-there were two bodies organized on exactly the same
principle as the, Senate and the House of Representatives of the
United States; the Council, in which the big states were predominant,
and the assembly, in which the small states were predominant, and,
accordingly the question of electing the judges was settled by providing that they should be elected just exactly as laws are passed by
our Congress, requiring in the election of a judge the concurrent,
separate votes of both of those bodies, just as the passing of a law
in the government of the United States requires separate and concurrent votes of both the bodies of the national legislature. Then the
difficulty that they might not agree was met by importing bodily into
the system our American Committe of Conference, in which so many
thousands of laws have been thrashed out and settled upon when
it seemed impossible that the Senate and the House could agree;
and provision was made that if, after a certain number of votes,
there wasn't an agreement, a committee of conference was to be
appointed, and that they were to have full scope and find somebody whom they could recommend to both houses for election. And
on that basis, that old bugaboo of 1907 was dissipated, and that is the
way in which the court is now proposed to be organized. You will
perceive that that is essentially fair because it enables each party
in the community of nations to exercise a veto against unfairness
by the other. The assembly can always prevent the Council from
being unfair. That is, the small nations in the assembly can always
prevent the big nations from being unfair. And the big nations,
small in number, in the Council can always prevent the small nations,
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in great number in the assembly, from being unfair. They can each
force fair treatment of the subject and effect a satisfactory solution.
Then, there was another question which was very serious, and
that was the question of jurisdiction. The plan of 1907 provided
for no obligatory jurisdiction. It merely provided that this court
was to have jurisdiction over all questions-international questions
-submitted to it. But, here was a provision in the Covenant of the
League, that all questions disagreements, disputes, which were not
submitted to arbitration, were to be sent to the Council or brought
before the Council. Now, the Council was not a body of judges.
It was a body of diplomats. The obligation of a member of the
Council is not to do justice as a judge, but to protect the interests
of his country for which he casts his vote, and the natural effect of
giving the option either to arbitrate or to go to the Council would
be that the nations which felt their case to be weak in a matter of
law or justice, would always refuse to arbitrate and instead go to the
Council where it could be negotiated. Accordingly we came to the
conclusion that we ought to have obligatory arbitration upon questions of strict legal right, and we put that into the plan, in the
exact words of the resolution of this Association and of the amended
Article 13 of the Covenant which embodied those words. We provided that the court should have jurisdiction of all questions that
were submitted by both parties-international questions-and should
have jurisdiction over all questions of international law, interpretation of treaties or of the direct effects of the obligation over which
the dispute arose.
There was one other subject which was quite important, and that
was the question whether countries in litigation were to be represented in the court. That was a difficult subject because the first answer
if you were to ask any national or municipal lawyer would be-no.
Yet, upon very full consideration we all came to the contrary conclusion, and I have no doubt that it was quite proper. Of course,
there are representatives of many countries in the court. Every
member of the court comes from a different country" and we had a
provision that no more than one shall come from one country, but
few small countries can be included in the court, and so we provided
that a country not included in the court should have a right to have
a judge of its own people put into the court for the purposes of that
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case. And the reasons for it are these: The greatest obstacle to
doing justice as between nations is a failure of nations to understand
each other. I don't believe anybody can appreciate that without
actual experience. Many years ago I was called upon to argue in
the Supreme Court of the United States a case relating to the effect
of a French judgment in this country. I see Mr. Coudert in front
of me smiling because he remembers the case. There had been a
suit brought by the administrator of the old firm of Alexandre, the
maker of kid gloves, against A. T. Stewart & Company over some
contract for gloves. The suit was brought in Paris and judgment
was obtained there, for I don't remember how many millions of
francs, and suit on that judgment was brought here in the Circuit
Court of the United States. Judge Wallace held the judgment to
be conclusive, and he at that time said that it would be merely impudent for us to assert that the French system of obtaining justice
was not just as good a system for doing justice as our own. I studied
the subject very carefully, and I came to the conclusion that Judge
Wallace was right-with a qualification, and the qualification was
this: The French system was adapted to doing justice between
people who had French ideas and did their business in the French
manner, and an American would have very little chance under it.
On the other hand, the American system is adapted to doing justice
as between people who have American ideas, and who do their business in an American way, and a Frenchman would have very little
chance under it. Well, you find that difficulty everywhere in the
international affairs, and in no other class of people in the world
can you find it more inveterate than among lawyers. We passed hours
and hours and days in that committee in discussing subjects where the
only difference was not in our discussion or in what we were saying,
but in a different set of ideas in the backs of our heads, and it requires experience to understand that there is such a difference of
ideas. Lord Phillimore and myself, the two representatives of the
common law system countries, found ourselves up against a grantie
wall very often, and I suppose that the continental lawyers found
themselves in the same attitude as to Lord Phillimore and myself.
It required long and patient effort to Efnd out what we were talking
about. Now, we agreed that in order that justice should be done in
the international court, there ought to be some one man at least
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in court who understood the habits, the customs and the reactions of
the people.a party litigant to any proceeding, and the result was that
we provided for such a court-for the present-of eleven judges and
four alternates or supplemental judges, to be elected by the separate
and concurrent votes of these two bodies. They are to be judges
sworn as judges under the honorable obligation of the judicial office,
doing no other business, and they are to sit there and decide international cases according to law.
There were also a great number of ancillary provisions about the
court. They, are to be paid regular salaries. They are to reside during the sessions of the court at the seat of the court. The seat of the
court is to be The Hague. There are provisions for special tribunals
upon the request of the parties during vacation. There is a provision
for a Chief Judge. Upon application of the parties, the Chief Judge
is to designate three judges to take up a case which may be urgent
during vacation time. The court will always be ready to do business. At the same time we provided for the continuance of the old
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague for the purpose of
dealing with questions which involve subjects not altogether justiciable but appropriate for arbitration, so that the old tribunal, which
has some of the characteristics of John the Baptist, is not to be destroyed.
I should have mentioned the fact that the election of these judges
is to be from a list which is made up by the members of the old Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. The members of that old
court from each country are to send to the Secretary General at The
Hague two names for each vacancy when this new court is to be put
into operation. My friend, Mr. Strauss, whom I see smiling before
me, and Judge Gray and Mr. John Bassett Mloore and myself will
have to get together and propose two names of men whom we think
fit to be judges and who, we have ascertained in some way satisfactory
to ourselves, will probably be willing to serve as judges, and send
them on to the Secretary. All the countries are to do that. And
from the list thus made out, these two bodies, the Council and the
Assembly, are to make their selections so that you will get the sort
of personnel for the court as far removed as practicable from the
ordinary influences of politics for what there is in it.
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Of course, the action of the committee, which was unanimous,
does not decide anything. The committee simply reports to the
Council of the League of Nations, by which it was constituted, and
the Council now has this plan before it. I don't know what they
are going to do with it. In some form or other it will be laid before
the Assembly of the League of Nations, which is to meet next month
in Geneva. I don't know what they will do with it. It may be that
there will be so much opposition to the obligatory feature of arbitration, that they will strike it out.* I don't know. I hope not. But,
whatever they do with it, that step is taken. Another step forward
has been taken, and it is there by the unanimous agreement of fairly
competent representatives of the diverent nations situated in different
parts of the world, widely differing in their interests and characteristics and size and, wealth-by the unanimous agreement of a
fairly representative body of men familiar with the subject-a plan
for the formation of a court to deal with international questions upon
grounds of public right, just as the Supreme Court of the United
States, and the Court of the King's Bench of Great Britain, and the
Court of Cassation of France, deal with questions of municipal right.
I say a unanimous agreement has been formulated for a plan of such
a court. Now, this is a step in advance in the procesaes of civilization.
All the processes of civilization are slow. All advances shock somebody, and an attempt to go too fast, too far at once, almost always
ends in failure. "Leg over leg the dog went to Dover." I have
often thought in observing the progress of improvement of the law
in Washington that every good bill had to have a period of gestation. I remember a bill which did great signal service had been
knocking at the door of Congress from year to year for thirteen
years. It started with nobody for it, and finally some one opened
the door and-said, "Why don't you come in?" And that is more
so in international affairs. Every step forward has to come in contact with the ingrained habits, preconceptions, involuntary reactions
of vast multitudes of people, and they have got to be treated just as
a nervous horse is treated. If you go at him too fast, you get into
trouble. Now, it is very much so about this jkidicial business. You
have got to go step by step. It is five, nearly six years now since the
*The obligation feature has been eliminated.
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Constitutional Convention of this state adopted a provision for the
reorganization and condensation of state government and what is
known as the budget system. A great majority of the convention
had agreed upon it, but it was overwhelmingly defeated at the polls.
Yet more than twenty states have adopted it since, and the Governor's Commission appointed by the Governor who at that convention
opposed it, has now recommended the same thing. Substantially all
the important advances upon the Constitution of 1846, which were
made by the convention of 1867 in this state were adopted afterwards,
although their plan was rejected at the time.
Now, this idea of arbitration, this idea of affording a substitute for war by the processes of justice, was laughed at in 1899.
It was adopted by the 1899 Conference only because they had to do
something to save the Czar's face. The Czar had called the Conference of 1899 for the purpose of agreeing upon disarmament, and
Germany and some other countries were unwilling to have the subject discussed, but the Conference was called and they had to do
something, and so they considered that they would give the children something to play with, and they got up this arbitration proposal. All the wise people said, "Oh, don't bother about it." Very
likely, if our government hadn't sent the Pious Fund case there for
arbitration between the United States and Mexico, and if it hadn't been
for the backing of the government of the United States lJroceeding
upon the universal sentiment of the people of the United States in
favor of giving this substitute for war a chance by the attainment
of justice through judicial procedure, the court would not have
amounted to anything. But, it did; and it was enlarged and improved
upon, and it was the adoption of that plan in 1899 which made
possible the improvement of the plan by the Conference of 1907. The
former Conference provided the basis for the 1907 plan for a Permanent Court of Arbitration, and this in turn was what made it possible for this committee to agree upon the concrete plan for a court;
and whether this plan be adopted as the committee agreed upon it,
or not, it is a step in the direction upon which hereafter the great
progress of civilization towards justice in place of war will go on.
(Prolonged applause.)
That is all, I think, I have to say on this court. It is a pleasure
to talk to lawyers about it. Perhaps I should speak on one more
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little thing about the court, and that is-procedure. There isn't
much procedure provided for. I didn't think it was advisable to
propose to the committee the adoption of the New York code. There
is really very little procedure, but a few little things which we thought
were necessary were put into the plan of the court. Where you have
a great many countries, all-with different procedures, it is necessary
to be quite general in your rules, and one result of this is, I am sure,
that you will get along so much better in dispensing justice.
I want to add that I had very great pleasure later in the summer,
in September, of going back to The Hague after finishing the work of
the committee, and presiding in an arbitral tribunal and rendering
the first judgment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the
Hague in the Peace Palace-practically inaugurating that building;
and I wish I could tell Ir. Carnegie about it. It was a controversy
in which England and France and Spain and Portugal were concerned over the liability of Portugal in the seizure of properties in
possession of the religious orders in Portugal at the time of the
revolution in 1910. The arbitration was agreed upon in 1913 before
the war, and M. Lardy, the old Swiss Minister at Paris, and M.
Lohman, the Dutch jurist, and myself were made the arbitrators.
The war suspended the proceedings, but they were revived after the
war, and in September, the case was brought to an end by the jadgment, so there is actual demonstration that the old Permanent Court
of Arbitration at The Hague still lives.
Now, I would be very glad to answer questions.

